Introduction
A long process of state-institutional change underlay the eventual swift restructuration of Northern Ireland in the 2000s.This article shows that it took a threshold form. The argument abstracts from the drama of politics within Northern Ireland in order to highlight the intrastate processes that incentivised radical change in parties and paramilitaries there and to contribute to comparative analysis of state change in conflict situations.
The concept of a threshold is used in the social sciences to refer to a step or phase in a process of change, one that is difficult to pass but which, once passed, produces swift observable outcomes (Lustick, 1993, 43-46; Pierson, 2004, 83-86) . Thresholds are likely to characterise state-change in conflict situations because the intensity of opposing interpretations, the embeddedness of state responses, the urgency of security imperatives and the determination of veto players tend to block incremental forms of change. Ian Lustick (1993 has argued that in cases of 'state contraction' a long slow process of overcoming internal 'ideological' and 'regime' (military) thresholds precedes a swift process of boundary-change. However there has been little elaboration of these ideas for other conflict situations. This article shows a process of state threshold-crossing which affected sequentially British orientations, prioritisations and policies in Northern Ireland. It uses new 2 evidence in the form of over 70 elite interviews with senior British and Irish politicians and officials who made, influenced and closely observed the process.
Threshold phenomena exhibit seemingly sudden change after a long period of stasis or failed attempts at change. British policy in Northern Ireland follows this pattern. In the first decade of direct rule there was a sequence of failed political initiatives, a focus on economic development and fair employment that by the mid 1980s was proven to have no impact on Catholic relative disadvantage, and a security strategy that increased Catholic and nationalist 'alienation' and polarised the communities without stopping the IRA (O'Leary and McGarry, 1996, chapter 5) . From the later 1980s, effective fair employment and socioeconomic policies were being put in place, and from the later 1990s a rapid process of restructuration transformed the character of social relations within Northern Ireland putting an end to the gross communal inequalities of the past (see Osborne and Shuttleworth, 2004 ; McCrudden et al, 2009; Ruane and Todd 2012) .
A threshold model of British state change is of interest in three ways. First, it provides a new perspective on how the British state role and policies in Northern Ireland changed, identifying the mechanisms by which seemingly unbreachable limits of state action and constraints on state policy came to be seen as malleable, open to pragmatic change. At the same time, it shows the difficulty of the process and the contingency of change (or lack thereof) at key points.
Second, it is of direct relevance to comparative theories of conflict and settlement. It has been shown that horizontal inequalities in general, and state exclusion (of politicised minorities) in particular, are highly correlated with violent conflict (Stewart et al, 2008 , Cederman et al, 2010 , Cederman et al, 2011 , and that moves towards 'inclusion' predispose to settlement (Brown et al, 2012) . There are related debates on the relevant types of inclusion and the 3 relative importance of exogenous and endogenous actors in such change (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2007) . This case sketches a model of threshold change where exogenous influence (not intervention) triggers increasing endogenous interest in and enthusiasm for the process, where recognition of 'exclusion' is itself a product of political change, and where the type of 'inclusion' which motivates settlement is highly dependent on the timing of change. It shows how seemingly immovable limits of state-ness can be made almost indefinitely malleable.
Third, the threshold model speaks to a pressing moral concern: 'If settlement was possible at all, why was it not possible sooner?' It shows that the Northern Ireland settlement was underpinned and stabilised by a longer slower process of state change. If it might have been accomplished sooner or better, it would always have been difficult to change entrenched understandings and habits of state-craft, to reprioritise the agenda, and to confront determined veto players.
The analysis that follows is informed by interviews conducted with British and Irish elites who were involved in intergovernmental negotiations and institution-building (see Appendix). Elites do not always know, recall, remember accurately or wish to reveal information about the past, and they do not have privileged insight into causal processes.
However interviews remain one of the best sources for accessing the understandings, conceptual frameworks and perspectives of elites, permitting in-depth questioning, and allowing comparisons over time and between respondents.
1 The causal narrative that runs through the article is constructed by interpreting the interviews and other evidence in light of theoretical concepts of institutional change and threshold crossing, with the concepts in turn revised in light of the evidence. The resultant 'analytic narrative' is to be judged for its merits in incorporating the range of British and Irish perspectives, for its explanation of the phasing and process of change, and in comparison with alternative scholarly explanations of 4 the process (see Bates et al,1998, 10, 12) . It shows only one strand of a complex process leading from conflict to settlement, but a crucially important one.
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Understanding state institutions in Northern Ireland: the theoretical approach
Research on the changing British role in Northern Ireland has emphasised its constitutional aspects (O'Duffy,2007; O'Leary, 2007) , its ideational aspects (Aughey and Gormley Heenan, 2011) , changes in alliances and ideology (Patterson 2001 ) changes in cognitive learning processes and representative forms (McGarry and O'Leary, 2004 ) the development of public policy (Cunningham, 2001; Smith, 2011) and the processes of Anglo-Irish negotiations (O'Kane, 2007) . This article takes an historical institutionalist focus, understanding state institutions not in terms of formal rules but of embedded and enforced practices which vary with the wider power structure and institutional matrix, and the related popular and elite expectations and coordination practices. 3 Thus it is as concerned with the assumptions that frame political practices as it is with specific policies and formal institutional and constitutional rules. Such an approach is particularly appropriate in this case because (i) the matrix of state institutions is too unwieldy for top-down change in the constitutional/institutional rules to have the intended effects (ii) institutional practices and norms are so embedded that focus on individual actors' contingent choices, slips of attention and misjudgements is likely to miss the patterned constraints on choice, and (iii) the multitude of short-term policy initiatives mask important changes that are visible only in a longer term perspective.
The historical institutionalist approach was developed in the field of political-economy where transformative change is more often incremental than revolutionary (Streeck and Thelen, 2003, 4-9, 18-30) . Incremental change is difficult in conflict situations: veto players are more determined, interpretations of events more polarised, axioms of state-practices and norms 5 unquestioned, security concerns highlighted and the consequences of bad decisions are more likely to be catastrophic for state and population. Recent research on Northern Ireland, for example, shows that reform was managed very cautiously, and for periods not at all, in part for security reasons (see Craig 2010; Patterson, 2011; Bew, Frampton and Gurruchaga, 2009 ). The mechanisms of incremental institutional change found in other fields occurred in
Northern Ireland (Todd, 2011a, 845-53 ) but they failed of themselves to produce transformative change. Unless such change is to be imposed by rebel victory or international insistence it is likely to take a threshold form where considerable strategic effort is necessary to change interpretations and overcome veto players (Lustick, 1993, 43-6) .
Ian Lustick (1993 37-46; 2001, 81-6) has argued that state contraction (withdrawal from a territory) takes a threshold form precisely because the process of state expansion involved steps that had 'ratchet-effects' that once taken become very difficult to undo. He posits two major obstacles to state-contraction -the first ideological (the 'ideological hegemony threshold') where the territorial shape of the nation is taken as unchangeable, and the second military (the 'regime threshold') where contraction threatens civil war. Withdrawal happens suddenly, but it depends on difficult and slow prior processes of ideological change and change in the intra-state power-balance. Lustick predicts a changing form of politics at each stage: slow and difficult change in the frame of understanding, achieved by strategic discursive action until the 'ideological hegemony threshold' is crossed; a changed form of political debate as withdrawal ceases to be unthinkable but now becomes impractical, risking civil war; change again when the 'regime threshold' is crossed and withdrawal becomes a pragmatic political matter of timing. In the only successful case he discusses (French disengagement from Algeria) passing these thresholds required a phased set of strategic interventions which first changed public and political assumptions and expectations, and (Kerr, 2006, 68-70 ; Bloomfield , 2007, 42-9 ; Craig 2010, 176-80 ) . A reconstruction of the process shows how state structures and practices made this outcome likely.
There was, first, a lack of sustained attention to or prioritisation of Northern Ireland. Heath moved Whitelaw, the only minister who had achieved some understanding of and credibility in Northern Ireland, to another post just before the Sunningdale conference; he gave relatively low importance to the Sunningdale conference (O'Duffy (2007, 99-103) notes he saw it as a governmental initiative rather than an interstate one ); against advice, he held a general election in February 1974 at a time which allowed the anti-power sharing unionists to mobilise. Wilson in turn failed to pay attention to the rapidly deteriorating political prospects after February 1974 (Craig, 2010, 176-80) .
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This lack of attention followed from the routines of British political and territorial management in Northern Ireland which worked with the existing populations rather than providing them with incentives to change their views. Wilson's inattention to the looming crisis has been much criticised (Craig, but his inaction was not unprecedented:
no British Prime Minister made any attempt to change or channel popular views in Northern
Ireland since its foundation. The effects in 1974 were disastrous: ordinary unionist supporters, who finally proved decisive in bringing down Sunningdale, were left to make up their own minds in a situation where expectations were formed by competing local elites not by strong state action. This was doubly disastrous because administration followed the British tradition of reliance on locally recruited (and here largely Protestant and unionist) officials in the civil service, judiciary and security forces, and thus was heavily dependent on unionist consent.
This in turn exacerbated security concerns and led to paralysis of action: an unwillingness to confront unionist protest or to risk a 'war on two fronts' (Bloomfield, 2007, 48) Writing of his decisions in May 1974 , SOSNI Merlyn Rees (1985 pointed out that the security forces could not take on 'a whole community'. The merits of this stance have been much debated (Craig, 2010, 178; Bloomfield, 2007, 48) , but it is clear that it unnecessarily immobilised the government which made no attempt to divide the middle unionists who did not like power-sharing from the political and paramilitary opponents who were organising against it (see Kerr, 2006, p. 69) .
The failure of power-sharing merely confirmed elite assumptions that the fault lay in Northern Ireland not in British practices of governance there. After the strike, the Labour government set out to to reform Northern Ireland on the British model (McGarry and O'Leary, 2004, p. 202) . The result was a closure to nationalist views and grievances, an inability to see their rationale, and a propensity to side with unionists rather than risk their 9 opposition. There was indeed 'path dependence': it lay not primarily in stubborn nationalist aims (as McGrattan (2010) argues) but in the structural-institutional matrix which predisposed successive British governments towards socio-political stasis and against the flexible, attentive and focussed action that alone could have led to an alternative outcome. 4 Logically, only change in these institutionalised routines would permit a swift remedy of inequality and a tackling of conflict. Instead they were strengthened: the Northern Ireland parties were left to themselves in the 1975 Convention without incentives to reach agreement; stronger security measures were introduced with Ulsterisation (in effect Protestantisation) of the security forces. The sole effective channel for nationalist voice, the Irish government, was held at a distance: through the remainder of the 1970s intergovernmental contact was 'an elaborate, roundabout process' via the embassies. 5 Attempts at reform continued -notably the Fair Employment Act (Northern Ireland) 1976 -but had little impact (Ruane and Todd, 1996, 161-164 ) . Increasing nationalist anger was expressed in support for republican hungerstrikers and later electoral support for Sinn Féin, (Bew, 2007, 528-31) .
Crossing the recognition threshold: the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 and its effects
The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985 decisively changed the assumption that 'British rules' of territorial and political management were enough to ensure good governance. This was a crossing of the recognition threshold. Its import was quickly recognised by unionists (Todd 2011b ) and the British this time stood firm against their protests. . The effective impetus to change came from the Irish Coalition government, stung into urgent action by the republican electoral advance which they feared might lead to the destabilisation of their state (Lillis, 2010 (Lillis, , witness seminar, 11.12.2006 Armstrong (1993, 204-5) a strong consciousness of history coexisted with a determination not to be 'cowed' by it).
Mrs Thatcher was eventually convinced of the value of an institutionalised Irish presence in policy making. 9 The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 set in place an Anglo-Irish
Intergovernmental Conference (AIIGC) with the remit to discuss any matters relevant to the position of nationalists in Northern Ireland, with the two governments committed to 'determined efforts' to resolve any differences between them. It was serviced by a permanent Secretariat based in Belfast (Hadden and Boyle, 1989) . This time, widespread unionist opposition and protest failed to bring down the institutions.
The AIA has rightly been seen as an end to the unionist veto on change in Northern Ireland.
But it was more than this. Thatcher, disillusioned with the lack of cross-border security progress, was unwilling to constrain the security forces within Northern Ireland: one British negotiator of the AIA reports that when he later suggested ways to reform security practices, Thatcher's response was 'I thought you were supposed to be on our side'.
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The AIA made no impact on these different strategic priorities. It did, however, impact on British understandings and conceptual repertoires. By including political, not simply security, issues in the remit of the AIIGC, the AIA had introduced nationalist perspectives into policy deliberations for the first time. 24 The effect on policy was indirect. One Irish official described the 'sensitising' effect of the new institutions which he argued worked by 'attrition' since Irish officials could point out the bad effects of British security policies as'.
an everyday thing, and relentless.' 25 Although the immediate policy impact was less than the Irish had hoped, the most important effect -from an explanatory viewpoint -was conceptual:
it laid down a wide range of information, argument and policy repertoires for the future. In
Mahoney's and Thelen's terms (2009, (18) (19) (20) (21) , it increased the 'discretion of interpretation' in the policy arena. This impact was multiplied in the wider public sphere: through the AIIGC, 14 increasing numbers of nationalists were nominated onto public boards, and as the nationalist presence increased in public life, so the bounds of legitimate political discussion were stretched, nationalist concepts and language entered public and media discussion and the public sphere was 'converted' to one much more open to nationalist argument. 26 In addition, the AIA gave a precedent for British Irish initiatives and coordination which, by the 1990s, was generalised over every strategic initiative in Northern Ireland. Thus the AIA set in motion incremental change which created new recessive meanings and policy repertoires, changed the legitimate considerations that could be introduced into policy discussion, loosened the salience of territorial boundaries, put nationalist grievances on the political and public agenda. The conceptual resources necessary to map a new agreed strategic direction of change were incrementally being forged. By the same token, it gave unionists and republicans very strong incentives to change their strategies (McGarry and O'Leary, 2004, 123-7; Todd, 2011b) .
Crossing the agenda threshold: Re-prioritising and planning, 1991-5
For many British respondents, the real threshold of change was in the early 1990s and it involved both reprioritising and planning of change. British respondents from this period speak of a new direction of political will and attention: prime ministerial determination to achieve an inclusive settlement, and to devote the necessary resources to the process. 27 
Trying to make it a smaller and less heated conflict. Then trying to find a political settlement to which you could attract the main players 34
With the republican ceasefire in 1994, the new direction was confirmed and keeping up the 'momentum' of the peace process became a key aim for successive governments.
This was an institutional change of frame, a new official culture, that opened a whole set of new problems to be resolved. It was reflected in a new official discourse. If the makers of the AIA sensed that they were reshaping the historic British-Irish relationship, their successors in the 1990s took the changed relationship for granted. The recognition that Britain had 'no selfish strategic or economic interest' in Northern Ireland -seen as so important by republicans -was by the early 1990s no more than political common sense for the British respondents. 35 When questioned in a witness seminar (02.06.08) on their sense of the historical significance of the new institutions they helped create, senior British officials of the 1990s cheerfully noted that 'we are all historically innocent'. What was once a matter of philosophical concern and historical sensitivity had become normalised, a frame for practical were important in encouraging his action (Major, 1999, 440; 452-3) . This occurred through the long AIIGC meetings attended by cabinet ministers and, at prime ministerial level, by convincing the incoming leadership of Fianna Fáil (the Irish governing party for most of the 1990s and 2000s) of the merits of an incremental approach (O'Donnell, 2007, 87-160) .
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Other routes to an equivalent end might have been possible, but only if they succeeded in creating conceptual resources, momentum and sustained attention that were not just lacking in the British system before 1985 but were not officially recognised as lacking.
Crossing the implementation threshold: 1998-2007
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Many of the Irish officials saw the Good FridayAgreement of April 1998 as the major threshold after which institutional changes which had been blocked for years were swiftly implemented. As is well known, provisions for institutional change were integral to the Agreement, with provisions on prisoners and policing, criminal justice and equality, constitutional matters as well as on new representative, cross-border and British-Irish institutions (McGarry and O'Leary, 2004, 260-293) . The 1998 Northern Ireland Act in turn included a strengthening of the already strong equality provisions (McCrudden, 1999) .
Where agreement was reached -on prisoners, equality, and later in November 1998 on NorthSouth bodies -the British government moved fast to implement it. Difficult technical and legal problems of coordination -from the detailed legislation on equality to the devising of formulae for equivalent pensions for British and Irish employees in the cross-border institutions -were creatively resolved by officials on both sides. On issues where agreement was ambiguous (rights and parity of esteem) or required further reports (criminal justice, policing), British-Irish differences remained intermittently intense. Policing reform was particularly difficult because of the strength of feeling of the UUP and the government's desire to maintain David Trimble as its leader (Godson, 2004, 610-616 In the end, changes were made to Irish satisfaction if not to their dictation. Implementation British-Irish strategy and policy change was significant but uneven. In Northern Ireland, however, the effect on party strategies was indeed tectonic.
The passing of the Agenda Threshold took place in 1991-3 as full British attention and prioritisation was given to Northern Ireland affairs, concurrent with hopes that a settlement might be in view. There followed a concerted British-Irish planning process, with a change in official British political culture, which had now incorporated the resources and repertoires built up in the previous period and was increasingly focussed on practical problems of institutional design. In parallel, negotiations that would finally lead to settlement began. historically contingent practices, routinised expectations, vested interests and veto points which were too unwieldy for top-down change alone, but which proved highly malleable through the longer threshold crossing process. Whether this is a particular feature of the British state or more generally true is a question beyond the scope of this article.
The threshold model shows, finally, that the changes did not come quickly or easily. The swift restructuration of the 2000s was prepared for by a long process where recognition and agenda thresholds were crossed and veto players weakened. If the process might have been done differently and better, it might never have been done at all.
APPENDIX ; DATA SET AND METHOD
The data set used in this article comprises interviews with over 80 officials and politicians 
